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1
It is difficult to write about A. F. Losev. 
He is an infinite value beyond all the rational 
speculations. The authors, who write about 
A. F. Losev, should particularly keenly realize the 
incommensurability and the subsequent dramatic 
interrelations between them as authors and the 
man they write about. One should spiritually 
correspond and feel the destination to such 
writer’s work. Though this is true to any kind 
of work but a matter of understanding culture 
and such precious and unique crystals of spirit 
as A. F. Losev arising from its ground requires 
such mental attitude and spiritual power that are 
unique and exclusive themselves.
To tell in such a way does not mean that one 
should refuse from one or another methodology 
of study and rational clarity as a result of its 
use. But the point is out of any use of some 
methods and complex of methods in the sphere 
considered, a sphere of the highest achievements 
of society, i.e. culture. If it is true that a method 
is “a form of movement of the very substance” 
(G. W. F. Hegel), an instrument for study, a 
method for unique subject matters should be made 
anew every time. That is why A. F. Losev, to use 
A. I. Herzen’s word, can be measured neither by 
English, nor by French measure, nor by German 
philosophy’s measure even for an inch. We need 
a special measure here – Losev’s one.
But we could also retort here: for every 
phenomenon and every person are unique in 
their ultimate reality, hence one should treat them 
according to their merits.
All this is true but not every person or 
phenomenon deserve close attention. And 
nowadays just reason in its positivistic expansion 
without any restraint proclaims a formula of 
depletion of actuality through reflection. No, 
reflection is always incomplete, and if it occurs, 
it always follows actuality. After all, it is a fact 
of actuality, and if it really pretended to deplete 
actuality, it should also include the products of 
its own enlightenment in the sphere of reflexive 
analysis; it should venture at reflection of 
reflection and so on and hopelessly so on up to the 
point of formation of “ephemerae of ephemerae” 
and writing “diaries of ephemeral butterflies” 
(Jean Paul).
Denying so “perspective” pastime, one 
may come to the thought that mind is given to 
a human not for exercises in subtle reflective 
affectation but for solution of real problems of life 
and real problems of being. And the experience 
of solutions of these problems and questions 
by geniuses of the humankind, and hence by 
A. F. Losev, is beneficial: it not only deserves but 
requires study and comprehension. There are no 
reasonable alternatives to history of culture in 
general and history of philosophy in particular.
2
But the unreasonable alternative here is 
to present the point that history of culture and 
philosophy is an end in itself. Such an idea deprives 
the mentioned history of self-consciousness but 
nourishes it with illusions. History of philosophy, 
the Russian history of philosophy at least, except 
for A. F. Losev and two or three names, is entirely 
like this, with self-consciousness almost docked. 
So it would be quite unreasonable to ask lots of 
questions from lots of authors of lots of books 
on history and philosophy impressive by their 
optional character of judgments; their judgments 
are even often true concerning factual matters 
but they completely exclude connection with an 
author’s personality and actuality. Such books 
(not their authors) raise a question of sense of 
their own existence at the readers. They ask not 
an author but a reader: as for you, why do you 
need all these “necessity and chance” given in 
these pages in front of you? Then there come some 
“interesting interpretations”, “new approaches”, 
“original reviews”, and “fresh views” – generally, 
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the answers do not go beyond these. But all these 
are nothing but a trick and a wrapping for platitude 
often aware itself as that platitude. It is as if the 
problem is solved! It is as if one needs just a fresh 
view to embrace the entirety and bring it to alive 
and proximate end!
The books raising such questions and people 
giving such answers directly point at the fact that 
platitude and unreason may affect even scientia 
and homo sapiens. And then intensive and even 
exhausting work of mind may turn out to be a 
form of unreason and avoidance of cursed and 
very often damned questions of life.
Give up all your misty words,
Hypothetic lie,
To the questions damned and cursed,
Give us straight reply.1
The orientation to the world, individuality, 
society in its history and, as a consequence, 
denial of “simple hypotheses” can bring anyone 
(even those ones who study at universities) to 
the conviction that least of all history of culture 
and philosophy should be a toy for the mind 
which can possibly be refined and sophisticated 
in itself but socially infantile, hence infantile in 
its sophistication and fastidiousness. The thing 
it chooses as its toy unambiguously displays the 
extent of its infantility.
3
Reason should be serious and high-spirited 
even in its games and jokes; otherwise it is not 
reason at all. A. F. Losev writes: “Time is pain 
of history”. But a relief of pain means a relief of 
history. A historian’s mind is to be courageous, 
serious and fearless for a historian gives his heart 
to time – otherwise he is not a historian.
Death and Time reign in the world.
You should not call them lords…2
But this “reign” of Time and Death can be 
overcome only by draining the cup of suffering 
to the lees gathering times in eternity.
S. S. Averintsev writes about his teacher 
A. F. Losev: “It seems that since Vasily Rozanov 
and Pavel Florensky there has not appeared 
anyone who dared speak about the subject 
matters, which are customary to call the abstract 
ones, with such ultimate frankness. Each word 
is thick and ponderable; each word has its scent 
and taste, and, by the way, it is a very strong 
prose not despite of but due to its angularity and 
roughness. It is difficult to forget such passages 
as the description of internal atmosphere around 
the New-European representation of Cosmos in 
“The Dialectics of Myth”; they sink into the mind 
and worries imagination. The emotional tone 
is apropos here for Losev’s matter is history of 
philosophy not as a painless “filiation of ideas” 
but as a tragedy. His point is a tragic history of 
philosophy, not some other one”3. I would let me 
to give one of such passages about the tragedy of 
philosophy and philosopher here.
A. F. Losev writes in his “Essays on 
Ancient Symbolism and Mythology” (1930): 
“But now let us speak out the other idea – here 
it is about not the logical content of dialectics 
but about its extra-logical value. Suppose we 
have admitted the fact that its antinomics is 
logically justified. But is it justified in life or 
at least widely philosophically? What is the 
explanation of this laughing and behaving 
rather outrageously self-contradiction of being 
and everything thinkable? We should think here 
as follows. The strangeness and queerness of 
deductions of dialectics entirely depends on that 
we, who wish to deal with dialectics, indeed, 
have got into a very strange and extraordinary 
area. Such area is an area of pure reason. Look 
at the life. Where can you find pure reason, 
pure sense, and perfect consciousness here? 
Everything flies, changes, and becomes opaque, 
clarified and opaque again. A whole thought 
is permeated by casual sensations and images. 
Eidoses of things are so often beclouded by 
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various external additions. If it is not Plato’s 
“Cave”, anyway, it is not anything better in 
point of clarity and lucidity. Everything is fuzzy 
and turbid; everything yearns, suffers, and acts; 
everything is blind, aimless, and irresponsible. 
Certainly, life is also full of sense, meaning, 
clarity, light, and purpose. But, in general, being 
is an indissoluble mass of passions and reason, 
joys and pains, light and dark. But we have 
suddenly come to a want to become dialecticians. 
What does to be a dialectician mean? To be a 
dialectician means to see all the entirety of life 
as something undivided. To be a dialectician is 
to be able to derive every particular and hardly 
distinguishable moment from that entirety and 
to be able to bring it back to that entirety. To be 
a dialectician means to be able to see not only 
with eyes but with mind, to be pure in mind. 
Let dialectics also comprise everything out of 
reason. All the same, it comprises by reason 
in a mind and for a mind. But where and when 
do we use pure reason in our life? Where and 
when are we able to see? Where and when is our 
thought a pure mirror of being and its inner life 
pulse? It almost never occurs to us in our life, 
and we have suddenly come to a wish to become 
dialecticians. Hereupon, how can it be surprising 
that our findings in such an “unvital” sphere will 
appear to be strange, weird, and puzzling? Is not 
it puzzling to try to live in reason and to speak by 
reason? Is it not a tightrope-walking to balance 
in the height of pure reason trying to move away 
from the brink of abyss as far as possible? Yes, 
dialectics is puzzling because it is a mind, nous. 
Philosophy is an acrobatic art for one have to 
be an equilibrist in life in order to fence oneself 
off that very “life” and “reality” and in order to 
make one’s thoughts pull together and live their 
own life. Thus, dialectics is eccentric not more 
than a philosopher nowadays (in Plato’s time, 
too). And its conclusions are not stranger than 
a desire to live by one’s reason in reason while 
life rages and bears malice against every reason 
and meaning.
But dialectics becomes apprehensible in its 
antinomic substance. We could see that dialectical 
propositions are completely antinomic and self-
contradictory. Why? Because we retreated from 
life experience and habits of everyday life and 
took exclusively ideas of reason. A purely idea 
of reason is to be contradictory, i.e. to sublate 
(Aufheben) itself, since we have already sublated 
it from life and being. It is like a creature able 
to live only in water, and when it is withdrawn 
out to the air, it pants and flutters in a desire to 
return to its home element as soon as possible. 
It is like a bird caught and put in a narrow cage. 
A creature born for freedom but put into a jail 
shivers, struggles and cannot wait until he is able 
to fly freely in the boundless sunny dome of the 
sky. And pure ideas of dialectics are those living 
creatures withdrawn from the element of free air 
and put into the cage of systematic differentiation. 
They cannot wait until the moment they are able 
to plunge into the ocean of life again and live in 
the absolute unity with it.
This is the vital nerve of dialectical 
contradictory nature – it lies in deficiency of 
life and abstractness of philosophy. But what 
should we do? Here is the sense and tragedy of 
a philosopher. A philosopher “loves wisdom” 
and wants to understand life. But life is not only 
understanding. Therefore, in order to understand 
life, i.e. as if in order to become closer to it, a 
philosopher has to go away from it at some 
distance, sometimes very far and sometimes he 
has to retreat from it at all. One cannot understand 
life without living and creating life, otherwise 
what should a philosopher understand? But one 
cannot understand life without retreating from 
it and retirement into eremitical “contemplation 
of ideas”, otherwise when and how can one find 
time to understand life? This contradiction is 
an essence of a philosopher. And it is also his 
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tragedy. It becomes clear, profoundly clear the 
condition of thought when an affirmation is equal 
to a negation, for philosophical life is like that 
and the very life is like that. Certainly, this is a 
tragedy of culture in general for culture is, first of 
all, creation of understanding of life.
It is unnatural and awry to dwell in the 
sphere of abstract ideas and their dialectics, for 
life is not an idea and it is not only dialectics. 
But it cannot be helped. Of course, it would be 
better not to suffer and die. But what can we do?! 
If a human is destined to live like that so it could 
be a pure idea and think like that so it could be 
a completeness of every life aspiration, it cannot 
be helped. So let us not reproach dialectics 
because of philosophy of contradiction. In 
general, philosophy in its essence and life in its 
essence are like that”4.
4
We would make an inexcusable mistake if 
we thought that A. F. Losev, who wrote this about 
philosophy and a philosopher and about life and 
culture in such a way, made an exception for 
himself and did not consider his life to be a tragic 
one, and regarded himself as one of philosophers 
out of that tragedy of philosophy, the philosophers 
“who saw a joyful life and laughed at the very 
death”. But the tragedy with all its possible breadth, 
and even universal breadth, always has some 
definite inevitability, vastness, and omnipotence 
of chance realized post factum as suddenness. 
Therefore every philosopher will always find 
some contradictions even in simply logical terms 
of mistakes, mess, and absurdity, etc. whether he 
realizes or does not realize the tragedy of being: 
he cannot evade inevitability and in awaiting 
suddenness he cannot be prepared for it and give a 
clearly logical and worthy answer. Otherwise it is 
not inevitability and suddenness and therefore life 
is not a tragedy at all. However if we have decided 
to push through into life, come from philosophy 
to society and history with philosophy, reach a 
personality, such “contradictions” should also 
find social and historical explanation and should 
be absolutely solved in a progression of unbroken 
thought. But this is elementary.
However A. F. Losev’s tragedy of his 
philosophical existence in its specific nature was 
formed not only as a process of various reactions 
to various influences of life, i.e. excess of pace of 
destructive influences over the pace of adequate 
reactions when life, as they call it, “has dabbed”. 
A. F. Losev’s tragedy is rather static, stiffened 
once and for all, combined with a full realization 
of a tragic personality unable to put up with such 
a life, an essentially invariable but essentially 
disgusting life.
This almost quarter-century public silence 
alone speaks about this constancy in life. And 
what about the manuscripts which were written 
in 1918 and could not find their publisher until the 
philosopher’s end of life in May, 1988? And what 
about the Areopagite’s corpus twice translated 
from Greek and twice lost for a Russian reader? 
And what about three library disasters happened 
to A. F. Losev? Twice the library was robbed 
and looted and once it was even entombed 
in the bottom of the crater from direct hit of a 
demolition bomb fallen on the house where 
A. F. Losev’s apartment was. A. F. Losev wrote 
about his second disaster: “The last hope of return 
to scientific work has died, for who am I without 
the library? It would be similar as if Chaliapin 
lost his voice or Rachmaninoff were without his 
grand piano. What shall I do, a musician, who has 
lost his instrument, which can be restored by no 
means?”
But the most important feature of constancy 
and hard fixedness of life influences on A. F. Losev 
was that A. F. Losev had to make creation of 
understanding of life all alone in cultural vacuum. 
But this life, this physical life in about ninety-five 
years, is not like that it could allow A. F. Losev to 
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form his own school of philosophy. And in this 
case, this is obvious: the greater philosopher and 
the longer his life – the deeper and more acute its 
tragedy.
Yet A. F. Losev had disciples. But either 
his or their impossibility to speak aloud or to 
write in public excluded them from the diurnal 
consciousness of culture. And we do not have to 
mention the arrangements of life on reasonable 
basis and active participation in the raise of reason 
degree of actuality (one never can say that this 
degree is too high) in the scope corresponding to 
A. F. Losev’s capabilities of mind.
Finally, here are these two senseless 
alternatives of being of mind emerged for 
A. F. Losev: either to fold his hands completely or 
to come to social consciousness in its inevitably 
transformed forms. A. F. Losev mind could not 
be inactive and it was also impossible for him to 
be indifferent to the society. So he consciously 
had to teeter on the brink of truth and fallacy 
since 1953 (the year of break of silence in 
public starting from 1930) until the end of his 
life. A. F. Losev decided on “deception exalting 
us” in full awareness of this deception and the 
fact that it does not exalt his own Losev’s mind 
and personality, – on the contrary, it humiliates 
them. And afterwards there would certainly 
appear some “smart alecks” reproaching him for 
retreat from pure truth, pure mind and for other 
sins like these. Such pseudo-guardians of truth 
should be asked: what have they done? And what 
were they doing when A. F. Losev was bringing 
the truth in such inevitably distorted forms to 
the public?
Because there is merely no one who can be 
on a par with the author of eight-volume “The 
History of Classical Aesthetics” in Russian 
history of culture and philosophy. And that is 
true not just for the Russian antiquity studies but 
also for all the works in all fields and periods of 
spiritual culture.
5
For instance, refer to the works by such 
greatly authoritative historian of the Old Russian 
literature and culture as Dmitry Sergeyevich 
Likhachov. Academician D. S. Likhachov is a 
head of the whole school in Russian cultural 
studies and history and criticism of literature. 
He is an author of lots of works and a founder 
of his own school in Russian studies. However 
all these could not serve as the base of the works 
even remotely similar to “The History of Ancient 
Aesthetics” by A. F. Losev in profoundness, 
detailed elaborations and global comprehension. 
But Losev had one and a half thousand years of 
tradition of antiquity studies which is not the 
same for history of Russian culture and literature. 
But we should not forget that A. F. Losev worked 
alone while academic institutes were not able to 
organize their potential for something similar to 
what one man was doing.
Meaning is not a function of time though 
it can be mixed with matter and thus it gets 
temporal being hence it has its history. Therefore 
one cannot say that detailed and fundamental, that 
is perfect works will appear by themselves after 
fifty or hundred years. Where from will these 
“works” appear without thinking and labour? In 
terms of resources, manpower, libraries and other 
things, the academic science was in a much better 
position than A. F. Losev. Nobody prevented it 
from making up for lost time and matching 
research traditions of antiquity studies as well 
as history of Russian culture according to the 
accumulated potential. But one has to condole with 
the academic science because it has lost socialist 
competition, the competition under socialism, 
to A. F. Losev. Undoubtedly, “The History of 
Classical Aesthetics” has enlarged the difference 
between meaning potential of antiquity studies 
and that one of history of Russian culture.
However it seems that I contradict myself – 
I demand impossible from the academic science 
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and try to compare what is impossible to be 
compared and then I lament that the comparison 
is not worth a row of pins. Still less I would like to 
reproach the academic science in general and one 
of its best, sagest, noblest, and most honorable 
representatives – D. S. Likhachov, in particular. 
Indeed, it is impossible to demand impossible 
things. But this shows (now it is a comparison 
again…) what A. F. Losev is capable of. This 
fetches out the dazzling light of the meaningful 
substance represented in his “The History of 
Ancient Aesthetics”.
6
From this point of view, “The History 
of Classical Aesthetics”, like all the other 
A. F. Losev’s works published after 1953, most 
of all needs not lamentation or laugh, admiration 
or dislike (one cannot go without them but they 
should not be senseless and precede realization), 
but social and historical comprehension.
  This work should be considered to be 
merely primary and elementary in historical 
and philosophical study even if there are various 
possible individually psychological and other 
difficulties of just comprehension of what is written 
and difficulties of reflexive following the author’s 
thought by a reader’s one. Unfortunately, history 
of philosophy is often substituted by formation of 
some kind of synthesis from the elements of that 
comprehended thing, which becomes unique in 
its marketplace spontaneity and narrow-minded 
optionality. And then all these things are sent to a 
printing press. The subsequent comparison with 
an original is almost always not in favour of that 
so called research. Why should one write about 
Plato in obscure, approximate and rough was 
when we can publish Plato himself and read him 
directly?
But this means that a historical and 
philosophical research must not be limited by 
one or another summary of an original read, for 
a summary is always poorer than the original 
epitomized. Why should we be content with the 
worst?
In a historical and philosophical research, 
though a reconstruction of meaning is 
indispensable, it should be exactly a reconstruction, 
i.e. it should not be as direct and immediate as the 
very meaning under reconstruction. Therefore, 
a reconstruction is to define a heart of meaning 
of an original as well as methods of shift from 
this focus of meaning to its periphery, i.e. the 
methods of comprehension of that periphery by 
that meaning.
But a work of philosophy does not exist in 
vacuum. It is imprinted in the tradition of meaning, 
enveloped by that tradition, continues it and 
thus negates it in its former mode. Accordingly, 
a historian of philosophy should take pains of 
comprehension of interaction of the tradition of 
meaning and a work of philosophy under study.
As well, this tradition of meaning is not 
the ultimate reality on the ground of which one 
or other masterpieces of philosophy took root, 
grew, and flourished. Tradition is made by men 
and society existing within times. So we should 
take the context of the whole social and cultural 
actuality in which one or another spiritual 
tradition arises and exists.
We can keep to various views on the 
relation between spiritual tradition and social 
and historical actuality. For instance, we can 
think that one or the other of them is primary 
and determinative in that relation; one of them 
can be the part of the other and vice versa. But, 
perhaps, nowadays, at the end of the 20th century, 
it is impossible to think of them as absolutely 
autonomous, irrelative and never associated with 
each other. But if it is so, the features of influence 
of social and historical actuality on one or another 
work of philosophy are to be brought to light. 
According to A. F. Losev, social and historical 
explanation should be definitive explanation of a 
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work of philosophy. But then A. F. Losev himself 
deserves such explanation most of all.
Did critics of A. F. Losev muse upon the 
sources of his turn to Antiquity? Why does 
that person have to preach Plato, a thinker who 
lived twenty-four centuries ago, to venture on 
disguise in literature and nevertheless to risk his 
own well-being and life? Why should he get into 
trouble because of Plato? Well, let Plato endure 
troubles! Here is one of specific features of 
social and historical actuality which gave birth 
to A. F Losev and befell him. A. F. Losev, a son 
of his 20th century, turns to 5 century B. C. and 
pays his exploratory attention to Plato though 
he definitely knows about the future enmity of 
actuality to him, A. F. Losev, because of that 
Plato.
Therefore it is important to understand 
social and historical actuality in its contradiction: 
it needs comprehension of the previous ages 
which gives birth to the men who are willing 
to meet this need of actuality before the deed 
of self-sacrifice. And that actuality is willing 
to send the precious crystals of spirit under 
grindstone, which it has grown with such labours 
and dedication.
Thus, according to A. F. Losev’s methodology, 
it will be right and adequate to study his creative 
life and personality as a specific phenomenon of 
social and historical actuality. And it is silly to 
reprove a person for one or other kind of mistakes. 
It is important to understand them as mistakes of 
the very actuality when a person making mistakes 
is a part of the whole in that actuality.
It is important to realize those mistakes 
as a consequence of inability of that actuality 
to contain really pure light of truth inside and 
thus content only with one or another cloudy 
and obscured view of that truth, “meonized 
eidos”. And, by the way, it is also important to 
understand that A. F. Losev made certain efforts 
so that a thoughtful reader could find a way to the 
full light and pure shine even in that meonized 
face. Deliberateness and contradictory character 
of many Losev’s statements leave no doubt about 
entire and adequate Losev’s awareness of what 
comes in a contradictory, cloudy, and deliberate 
form here. 
7
Every person is given to us and important 
for us (as well as for himself) foremost because 
of his actuality, i.e. not because of his ruined 
opportunities and dreams that have not come 
true, but because of his opportunities and dreams 
that have come true. This is an old thought spoken 
out by N. A. Dobrolyubov in relation to works of 
literature: “The things that an author wanted to 
tell us are not as important to us as the things that 
have been brought out by him, even if they it was 
involuntary and as a consequence of a truthful 
representation of life facts”5.
But the emphases I would like to put on 
this problem are considerably different and even 
opposite to those ones of N. A. Dobrolyubov. 
N. A. Dobrolyubov grounds his right to judge 
about actuality on a work of literature without 
any particular reckoning of some subjective 
mood, desires, and motives of an author of a work 
of literature. If an artist is really great, he cannot 
help conveying actuality in its essence. And 
N. A. Dobrolyubov is still quite profound to deny 
author’s “volitions” completely, and thus he comes 
to objective positions. But those “volitions” have 
their own importance, though secondary ones. 
N. A. Dobrolyubov orients himself according 
actuality as “life facts” and he judges about life 
and facts by a work of literature.
But I would like to turn backward – to judge 
an author’s personality from a work of literature. 
And though such reorientation brings about some 
kind of increase of the significance of author’s 
intentions, dreams, hopes, and so on, however, 
in this case, they are in the background. A work 
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of literature, a fact of literature is a result of a 
person’s objectification. So we shall not repel 
a personality from an object, and, moreover, 
according to A. F. Losev, a personality is an 
identity and a synthesis of subject and object. 
And if a work of literature contains a sense of 
one or another fragment of actuality or the whole 
actuality, it means that a sense is to be involved 
in identification of a personality and be included 
in his entire identification.
Once I was bluntly amazed by ontological 
capacity and breadth of one short note by 
N.A. Berdyaev, who was not deep as a writer 
because of his unsystematic character of writing, 
and sometimes he was even didactic and banal, 
but, perhaps, he was with some spark of genius 
due to that unsystematic character of writing. 
Namely, once, it seems that it was in his “Self-
cognition”, Berdyaev quoted something from 
F. M. Dostoyevsky’s “Demons” and added that 
despite the phrase belonged to Shigalev but still it 
did not matter. A reader may say: “What nonsense! 
How can one inscribe F. M. Dostoyevsky’s 
thoughts in long-eared Shigalev’s notebook?” 
What should we say to that? We should not 
identify Shigalev with Dostoyevsky but we should 
include Shigalev’s thoughts and Shaiglevism into 
F. M. Dostoyevsky’s world outlook.
And, perhaps, it is time to refuse from the 
ill positivistic manner to esteem only one or 
other abstract principles directly thrown out 
of actuality with its unscraped remnants for a 
world view. Who said that a world view must 
surely be abstract and theoretical one and have 
a formal record and any record at all? There is 
no such thing in life. The elements of a world 
view under investigation, which form that world 
view and mingles with each other, are badly 
perceived or are not realized by subjects of a 
world view; these elements may be brought to 
their pure essence on purpose of reasonable 
clarity. But, firstly, it is important to realize that 
it is we who bring that world view to its most 
possible clarity, not a subject; secondly, when 
the most possible limit of clarity and pure bases 
of a world view are achieved, we should define 
what consequences of those bases are brought 
about by a subject of a world view and what area 
a subject could elicit with a part of light given to 
him according to the bases of his world outlook; 
videlicet, we should define how and to what 
extent pure ideas mingled with matter and what 
“things” have come from that mixing and what 
matter has been transformed and converted per 
sample of those ideas.
Hence, it appears that if an author’s subject 
were not completely equal to one or another 
outlying object and if an author’s personality 
did not go beyond such objectivity which makes 
an author’s body given by Mother Nature, i.e. 
by father and mother, no writer’s work as well, 
as any other kind of work, would be possible to 
accomplish.
N. V. Gogol, that very genius and all-time 
N. V. Gogol, declared very explicitly that he 
could find every vice of his characters in his 
own soul. For vice depiction requires not only 
an abstract ability of abstract and notional 
reflection. An artist needs to feel and pass 
through the singularity of a depicted thing and 
to give it, at least, specific touch of life. Though 
here the artistic quality of a work of art appears 
to be problematic, and the way of artist’s attitude 
to a depicted thing in moral terms is quite a 
different question; that is a question of author’s 
conscience which is, by the way, alive and it is 
not a calculating machine. But it is clear that in 
order to represent some filth and outrage truly, 
even though to condemn and defeat those filth 
and outrage, it is absolutely necessary to gaze 
into them, to open one’s mind and soul for them 
and to let filth and outrage in oneself.
And here we should raise a question about 
specificity of one or another person’s world 
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outlook. Why did F.M. Dostoyevsky exactly 
produce the consequences out of the bases of 
his world view causing the prototypes of men 
killing old women and to prototypes like Pyotr 
Verkhovensky, the Stavrogins, Versilov, Myshkin 
or the Karamazovs? Why did the principles of his 
world outlook in interaction with the actuality 
lead to such results? While L. N. Tolstoy writing 
at the same time the results of interaction of world 
outlook bases with actuality were considerably 
different.
Apparently, every ordinary man as a man 
of the largest caliber, a genius, is ontologically 
limited both in his intellection and in his practical 
activities (in a less degree – in his caprices and 
claims, although, in the long run it is not without 
them): he is able to be neither the abstract mind 
nor the absolute doer. The nature of initial and 
primary premises in a personality structure and 
the kind of field it could turn to the consequences 
of intellective and subject-practical terms 
characterizes it as a specific and distinctive from 
other  personalities.
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Now we will try to approach closer to 
A. F. Losev. In his time, too, many people 
did many things: dug deep to the most useful 
minerals, bandaged the paws of wounded dogs, 
drank “the bitter”, wrote greeting cards, and rode 
home-made scooters devised of planks, nails, and 
big ball-bearings. Well, we can say: they were 
alive!..
It is obvious that even if A. F. Losev ever 
bandaged dog’s paws and even if he wrote 
greeting cards to them – those affairs were not 
of the principal kind determining his life and 
giving meaning and sense to it. The main thing 
determining A. F. Losev’s life should be sought in 
his works, for they most essentially filled his life. 
Herewith, it is not so important how A. F. Losev 
wanted to appear and speak out as how he has 
spoken out. It is not so important that because of 
some reasons, A. F. Losev failed to accomplish 
the conceived things but the most important thing 
is what has been done and created by him, though 
it might be without any special intention to create 
or it was a respond to very unpleasant and even 
destructive impact from the outside.
Works of a man or any other field of 
substantial appearances of a personality to the 
world and people is an essence and the ultimate 
reality of a person. If a person has a field of being 
most adequate to that person, we can ascend or 
descend to that field through that field of reality 
only, not through another. There is merely no any 
other field, and we can judge the personality only 
by his displays, but to judge essentially means to 
judge from essential manifestations which are to 
be somehow set apart from all others.
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Соперник времени: 
в поисках специфики личности А.Ф. Лосева
М.А. Бутин
Сибирский федеральный университет 
Россия 660041, Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79
В статье теоретически выстраивается структура личности русского философа Алексея 
Фёдоровича Лосева. Осуществлена попытка применить лосевские наработки по теории 
личности и мифу к самому автору этих теорий и критически осмыслить, насколько 
соответствует реальная личность её собственным исследованиям о личности.
Ключевые слова: русская философия, А.Ф. Лосев, Платон, личность, лик, субъект, объект, 
интеллигенция, эйдос, ум, дух, материя, тело, миф, чудо.
